



ROCKY MOUNTAIN CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE



Apr 4, 2024

Volume 33 Issue 4

April's Presentation: Bruce Ballard — The Chaotic Run-up to the First Ironclad Naval Duel



CSS Virginia and the USS Monitor in their famous duel at Hampton Roads

Lincoln's election brought issues of states' rights to a boil. Secession had begun! The potential loss of the Navy's powerhouse at Norfolk, Virginia, was of grave concern. An earlier decision to build six new powerful steam frigates, led by the USS Merrimack, had committed the US Navy to staying the course with wooden warships even though in Europe the adoption of iron cladding had become established.

Forward looking, Secretary of the Confederate Navy, Stephen R. Mallory, was committed to developing ironclad war vessels to break the Union Navy's blockading stranglehold on the South. Secretary of the Union Navy, Gideon Wells, was forced to embark on a new ironclad warship design to catch up and counter the South's development. Thus, the stage was set for the chaotic run-up to the building of competing "invulnerability", the South's chaos a result of its severe lack of resources and the North's chaos due to its commitment to a totally new and untested design, the USS Monitor.

Repercussions from that first battle at Hampton Roads in 1862 are seen even today in the design of the world's Navies.

Upcoming Presentations

Apr 11 — Bruce Ballard - The Chaotic Run-up to the First Ironclad Naval Duel (Hampton Roads)

May 9 — Walter Stahr - Sec. of War Edwin Stanton

June - Bye month

Jul 11 — Mark Leonard - Union General John Buford

Aug 8 — Wally Weart - Railroads in the Civil War

Sep 12 — Tim Smith - TBD

Oct 10 — Bob Wooley - CSS Alabama

Nov 14 — OPEN

Dec 12 — OPEN

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
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
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Captain Franklin Buchanan who served in the US Navy for 45 years was the only Full Admiral in the Confederate Navy. He commanded the CSS Virginia (Merrimac) in her famous encounter with the USS Monitor.



Vol. 1 of David Powell's new multi-volume study of the Atlanta Campaign



For the next couple of months we have Bruce Ballard and Walter Stahr doing presentations. Bruce has been very active in the roundtable doing presentations, assisting with technical support for meetings, and has been involved in study group trips. Looking forward to his presentation on the first ironclad naval duel at Hampton Roads.

Walter came for visit last year and spoke on Salmon Chase, a member of Lincoln’s cabinet. I consider Walter a “Professional Biographer.” He has completed biographies of 3 of Lincoln’s cabinet members including the subject for our May meeting, Sec. of War Stanton. He has also written a biography of one of the founding fathers, John Jay. I believe this was the 1st biography of Jay in many years. I will have information in the May newsletter concerning copies for sale that Walter is bringing to the May meeting. Looking forward to the presentation as we don’t have many presentation on political subjects.

Last thing on presentations, Matt Spruill whose March presentation we missed due to snow will be on the schedule as soon as we can get him.

Please continue to bring guests and potential new members to a meeting. I think the meetings, our presentation schedule, and the group itself are all selling points for new members. Please take a few minutes to say hello to someone you may not recognize at the social hour before the meeting. All of the new members bring their own interests on the Civil War and this only adds to our group.

Please remember that some of your fellow members recently had books published or soon will have books published in the University of Tennessee Press series, *Command Decisions in America’s Civil War Series*. Please continue to support their work.

I look forward to seeing you at the April meeting.

Ramblings ...

the Editor



Our own Larry Peterson standing next to a display of the Univ of Tennessee Press’s “Command Decisions in America’s Civil War Series”.


I hate when that happens! (Snow forcing us to cancel last month’s meeting, that is.) And wouldn’t you know it . . . we get 12-18 inches of snow and within three days it’s all melted off! That’s Colorado for ya! Oh yes, and Happy Easter to everyone!

Of course, we missed Matt Spruill’s presentation on artillery. Hopefully we can reschedule him for the not-too-distant future. We still have a couple tentative openings toward the end of the calendar year.

We’ve been having a good crowd for Study Group. See Don’s report on page 8 for details.

Then, I just wanted to give you all a heads up on two new books coming out this July. The first is volume 1 of David Powell’s new multi-volume effort on the Atlanta Campaign. I’ve posted a picture of Powell’s new book on the front page. This is a Savas Beatie publication, so it’s possible the final release will be delayed. It’s a hefty tome too – 624 pages. So beware.

Our own Larry Peterson has another Critical Decisions book coming out; this one on the Vicksburg Campaign. It’s timely in the sense that the campaign ended in July of 1863. So last year marked the 160th anniversary of Grant’s victory there. As a personal follow up project, if you want to see if Larry got it right, you could read Tim Smith’s five volume history of the campaign published by the University Press of Kansas.



Larry Peterson’s new release in the Univ of Tenn Press’s “Command Decisions in America’s Civil War Series.”

Nick Muller's Corner — *A Most Extreme Proclamation*



General Thomas Ewing, jr., was the foster brother of General William T Sherman. He became his brother-in-law when Sherman married his younger sister.

"General Order Number 11 was perhaps the harshest act of the U.S. Government against its' own people in American History." Author Thomas Goodrich

"Order Number 11 was the most drastic and repressive measure directed against civilians by the Union Army during the Civil War." Historian Albert Castel

This Proclamation was issued four days after William Quantrill and 400 raiders massacred over 150 men, burned over 200 homes and laid waste to Lawrence, the second largest city in Kansas on August 21st, 1863. The Order, issued by Union General Thomas Ewing, required all persons living in Bates, Cass, Jackson, and northern Vernon counties in Missouri to "remove themselves from their present places of residence." Everyone had to leave these four counties that were situated on the Kansas / Missouri border. Everyone. Alas, fifteen days later the area was, indeed, emptied of people. (Except around the 4 Union forts, so designated, in those counties.)

This region of the Country had been the scene of constant strife for more than seven years. Remember, the Kansas / Missouri border Wars had been going on since before 1856. Though far fewer people lived there in 1863 than had resided there in the late 50's, estimates still indicate that upwards of 10,000 and as many as 20,000 people were herded out of their homes and forcibly removed in less than 15 days after the issuance of General Order #11.

"Order Number 11 was the most drastic and repressive measure directed against civilians by the Union Army during the Civil War." - Albert Castel

Union soldiers and Union aligned bandits and marauders were none too gentle in their efforts to remove the population. Most properties were plundered and many were burned, creating huge prairie fires. Indeed, Cass and Bates counties were for years after referred to as the "Burnt Districts." For those few who could prove their loyalty to the Union, recriminations were not as severe. They could relocate to one of the 4 Union forts in the counties mentioned above. For the rest, just getting out alive proved to be their best alternative.

As one Kansas soldier related in his diary, three weeks after the Order was issued, "The border counties of Missouri have almost as desolate an appearance as before the soil was trod by white men. Not a man, woman or child is to be seen in the country to which the Order 11 applies. Chimneys mark the spot where once stood costly farmhouses...prairie fires are burning up miles and miles of land and everything denotes a state of utter desolation."



Yet another reason why the Union won the war. Missouri 1862? (wink)



George Caleb Bingham's 19th century painting "Martial Law" depicting the implementation of General Order #11

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On November 20th, 1863, Union General Thomas Ewing rescinded Order Number 11. All his earlier attempts to pacify the region had failed. His decision to turn the area into a virtual desert had the desired effect. Peace finally reigned over the region. There was nobody left to fight.

Decisions at Fredericksburg: The Fourteen Decisions That Defined the Battle

by Chris Mackowski

a review by Guy Bowman



Author, historian, tour guide, college professor, and co-founder of Savas Beatie's 'Emerging Civil War' series, Chris Mackowski.

Mention the Battle of Fredericksburg and for most of us what comes to mind is a series of Union army assaults uphill into the maw of an immovable, well-entrenched Confederate line. Charge after bloody charge. Thousands of soldiers' lives wasted marching straight into a meat grinder. And what of the Union commander General Ambrose Burnside? He's the goat, (and I don't mean "greatest of all time"). But was it really as simple as all that?

Chris Mackowski is a man with a lot of irons in the fire. A professor of communications at St. Bonaventure University, historian-in-residence at Stevenson Ridge on the Spotsylvania Courthouse battlefield. He leads tours on four major battlefields – Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Spotsylvania, and the Wilderness. He's probably best known in Roundtable circles for being the senior editor and co-founder of the *Emerging Civil War* series published by Savas Beatie. He is the co-founder of the *Emerging Civil War* blog. And he is the author or co-author of some two dozen books! A very busy man, indeed. Which is why it's so astonishing that Tom Wells from University of Tennessee Press was able to persuade him to contribute a volume on Fredericksburg for their *Command Decisions in America's Civil War Series*.

Mackowski is no stranger to Fredericksburg. He began his association with the battlefield in 2005 as a volunteer. Over the next fifteen years his career evolved, in his own words, from front-desk volunteer to tour guide to contractor to seasonal employee to battlefield preservation partner. He co-authored with his friend Kristopher White the book [Simply Murder: The Battle of Fredericksburg](#) in 2012, for the *Emerging Civil War* series. And as I understand it, Fredericksburg is Chris's favorite Civil War campaign.




Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, commander of the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg. Lincoln, disgruntled with George McClellan, had approached him once before to take command of the army. Burnside felt the command was more than he could handle. He only took the job when Lincoln offered it again because he felt if he refused a second time he'd be working for Joe Hooker, a man he detested.

Thanks to series co-editors, Larry Peterson and Matt Spruill, I was gifted a copy of Chris's [Decisions at Fredericksburg: The Fourteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Battle](#), Univ of Tenn Press, 2021. So, I thought I would give it a look. The book transformed my understanding of the battle. My original impression, as I described above, was but a caricature of reality. Matt and Larry's decisions template (formula) allows an author to bring a great deal of clarity to military combat encounters. The key decisions made in the course of a campaign are the building blocks for how events unfolded as they did.

And so, I discovered that Fredericksburg was a much more complicated affair than is appreciated. The Union army's position in Virginia in late 1862 was pregnant with possibilities. But it was also encumbered by certain nagging realities. First, it was December. Not a good time of year to begin a campaign due to the weather's volatility. Secondly, Major General (MG) Ambrose Burnside was only recently appointed command of the Army of the Potomac (AoP). He thought himself ill equipped to lead an army of 122,000 men. Thirdly, and probably most confounding, was the constant political pressure from Washington to produce something resembling a decisive victory. Lincoln desperately needed a military success to add psychological punch (cont'd next page)

MG William Franklin commanded Burnside's 'grand' division on the Union left facing Prospect Hill. Mackowski describes him as naturally cautious which might be an overly generous appraisal. His proposed attack on Lee's weakened right flank was sound in conception. But by the time he received Burnside's orders the next morning the situation had completely changed. Jackson had arrived with his corps of 30,000 men and occupied the hill.



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Confederate General William Barksdale. His Mississippians played hell with Burnside's engineers setting up the pontoons over the Rappahannock thus delaying Burnside's crossing over into the town. Even Henry Hunt's artillery couldn't dislodge them from their nests. It took a Union assault force crossing the river in boats and hours of house to house fighting to force them to withdraw.



Major John Pelham, CSA, shown above in his Academy uniform, was head of JEB Stuart's artillery. As Union divisions were deploying for their assault on Prospect Hill. Pelham took a single 12 lb Napoleon to their extreme left and from an exposed position just a couple hundred yards away enfiladed the Union line causing panic and confusion and disrupting their attack plan.

Before Jackson's corps arrived, Lee's right on Prospect Hill was weakly defended compared to Marye's Heights. In conference on Dec 12, Franklin proposed to assault the hill, punch a hole in the Confederate position, seize the road, and roll up Lee's line from Lee's right. Burnside approved the plan and prepared orders for the operation.


Sadly, Burnside's orders didn't reach Franklin until 7:30 AM on the following
(cont'd next page)

to his Emancipation Proclamation which he intended to start enforcing that January (1863). So, he pushed his generals. Every Union general who led the AoP lived under a Damocles Sword. Politicians were constantly looking over their shoulder and second guessing their every move. Their political loyalty was suspect unless their abolitionism was clamantly pronounced. Military failure could have huge career consequences leading to shaming, loss of command, and/or exile to an out-of-the-way theater of the war. Just ask General Charles Stone who ended up languishing in a northern prison over blunders made at Ball's Bluff (1861) for which he was in no ways responsible.


One of the problems endemic to changes in army command during the war was the lack of lead time a commander had to acclimate to his new job. General Burnside was forced to adjust quickly to his new responsibilities; responsibilities that he found daunting. He may have known most of the general officers in the AoP, but assuming command of the army changes the nature of those relationships. There was little time for him to learn the character and idiosyncrasies of his subordinates. The better one knows his "team", the nuances and subtleties of their personalities and style of communication, the less likely a misunderstanding that could negatively impact field operations. Miscommunication and abstruse wording of orders would make a singular contribution to the Union failure at Fredericksburg.

Wet weather, logistical logjams (the delayed delivery of pontoons for river crossing), and the inexperience of a new commanding officer would constrain the operational flexibility of the campaign. Fordable crossings of the Rappahannock existed both upstream and down from Fredericksburg. These offered flanking opportunities against Lee's defensive position on the heights above the town. (Joe Hooker would attempt such a maneuver against Lee the following Spring.) Because of the season of the year and the potential for a sudden rise in the river, Burnside feared stranding part of his army on the wrong side of a ford and having Lee cut it to pieces. So, he chose to concentrate his army at Fredericksburg, crossing over the Rappahannock on pontoons. The tardy delivery of the pontoons gave Lee time to consolidate his army and fortify his position on the heights. But even this delay did not preclude the possibility of a Union victory.


Burnside chose to organize his army into three grand divisions. MG Edwin "Bull" Sumner would command the "grand" on the Union right facing Marye's Heights. MG William Franklin, with the largest number of troops, would command on the left facing Prospect Hill. MG Joe Hooker's grand division would hold the center and provide support for the two apposing "grands." Mackowski affirms that Burnside had no vision of how the battle should unfold. He was a flurry of activity and indecision. The delays in crossing, the want of a battle plan, and his own lack of self-confidence would push him to a state of near emotional exhaustion. Then, an opportunity presented itself. Intelligence reports revealed the existence of a road running along the heights above the river and behind the Confederate position.



Maj. Gen. Edwin "Bull" Sumner commanded Burnside's right "grand" division facing Marye's Heights. Sumner's attacks on Dec 13th were intended to be merely a support to Franklin's main attack on the left. When Franklin went "inert" Burnside ordered repeated attacks on the Heights trying to force the issue. The seven successive assaults failed miserably and with great slaughter. Burnside, determined to try one more time the following day, intended to lead his own corps, the 9th, against the heights. Sumner, with his gravitas as senior general of the army, talked him out of it.



Maj. Gen. John Reynolds was one of Franklin's Corps commanders and was charged with managing the action against Prospect Hill. Reynolds chose his strongest division, George Meade's, to lead the assault. At a crucial point in the attack Reynolds was nowhere to be found. He was off attending to some artillery dispositions when Meade's men broke through an undefended portion of the Confederate line. For want of support, Meade was forced to withdraw.



Maj. Gen. George Meade, was without a doubt one of the most underappreciated generals in the Union army. He demonstrated competence at every level of command he held. Franklin and Reynolds' failure to support his success on Prospect Hill would haunt his memory of Fredericksburg.

of Lee's "sunken road" defenders. Why Burnside didn't personally oversee Franklin during the battle to insure his orders were being carried out, Mackowski doesn't explain. Perhaps no one can. Franklin had the divisions of David Birney, Abner Doubleday, Dan Sickles, as well as William "Baldy" Smith's whole corps available for action, but they remained uncommitted. (cont'd next page)

day. Mackowski correctly notes that delaying the assault until Dec 13th allowed time for Jackson's corps of 30,000 troops to move onto Prospect Hill, thus sealing the vulnerable spot in Lee's defensive position. Had Burnside attacked on the 12th Franklin's 40,000 troops would have only encountered a single division—Confederate General John Bell Hood's 7,300 men of Longstreet's corps.


In anticipation of Franklin's "grand" assault, Burnside assigned two extra divisions to his command bringing Franklin's total strength to 60,000 men. From this point forward, command and control broke down. Franklin, a very cautious sort, was confused by the muddled wording in Burnside's orders. Burnside's frenetic state of mind no doubt contributed to the confusion in his instructions. He appeared to want Franklin to lead off the assault with one division only, while holding his main force in reserve. The orders also named a road that was not the one located behind the Confederate position that they had discussed the day before. But more confusion followed. Burnside's orders also seemed to suggest to Franklin that Sumner on the Union right was to seize the road and roll up Lee's army from Lee's left. Again, quite contrary to their discussion of the day before. Of course, it didn't help that Burnside and Franklin were working from two different maps of the same battlefield!

Franklin assigned operational control of his assault to corps commander MG John Reynolds. Reynolds chose General George Meade's division to lead off the action. Ordinarily a full-strength division held 12,000 men. Meade's command had only 4,500. What followed was operational dissonance. Meade was able to force a break in Jackson's line in a marshy area that was left weakly defended. But his effort went unsupported. At a crucial moment in the fight, his corps commander, Reynolds, couldn't be found. He was off micromanaging the positioning of some artillery batteries. A division or two ordered in support (and there were several available) could have split the Confederate line. But there was no one coordinating the action. Without the manpower to exploit his success Meade was forced to withdraw. The lost opportunity would haunt Meade's memory of Fredericksburg forever after.

Franklin never sought clarification of Burnside's orders and never fully acted on their originally agreed upon plan. Burnside asserted that Sumner's assaults on the right were intended to be a support of the main effort (Franklin) on the left. He set Sumner's operation in motion before realizing that Franklin was not moving. When he discovered that Franklin was not following their "plan," Burnside repeatedly sent staff officers to urge him to attack in force. But Franklin demurred believing that Jackson's position was now too strong. He never told Burnside that he had called off his attack. Burnside continued the wastage on his right hoping Franklin would eventually respond. Some seven assaults including six or more divisions faced the withering fire



UNLIKE GEN. BURNSIDE, COL. LONGBROW'S FACIAL HAIR TREND NEVER CAUGHT ON.



Confederate General Jubal Early's division was deployed near the action where Meade's men had penetrated the rebel defense. Early was under orders from "Stonewall" Jackson to be prepared to march his command on a countermove Jackson had planned earlier when he realized there was a serious problem developing to his left. Jackson was a stickler for obedience to orders. So, Early had a critical decision to make. Should he stay put and allow the situation to worsen, or should he risk court martial and march to the sound of the guns. Early chose to disobey Jackson and confront the Union threat. His action stopped the Union breakthrough cold.

Indeed, one might conclude that the disaster at Fredericksburg was a succession of failed forced initiatives. There was, perhaps, one critical decision option that Chris missed in his analysis, and that concerned Lincoln. Though he does discuss the affecting issue - time. Lincoln felt he needed a victory to provide an exclamation point to his Emancipation Proclamation. So, he refused to allow the Union army to go into winter quarters. When he didn't get his decisive victory at Antietam, he issued the proclamation anyway. Then Fredericksburg followed. Which leads one to ask: was a victory even necessary or was this simply about political optics?

Lincoln was always operating in "hurry up" mode as it concerned the war; playing the game of "generals roulette." If one general didn't work, he tried another. He seemed unaware of or completely indifferent to the impact this had on army morale, continuity of operations, and military strategy and tactics. The cost was paid in tens of thousands of lives. Perhaps the one leader most responsible for the debacle at Fredericksburg was the one who wasn't there - Abraham Lincoln. He simply refused to slow down. He wanted to win the war now, not tomorrow! He thought he could control the war and its pace. And soldiers died.

Burnside intended to personally lead one more assault against the Heights on the morning of the 14th at the head of his old corps, the 9th, when mercifully his most senior general "Bull" Sumner talked him out of it. Burnside would graciously take full responsibility for the disaster.

What I've shared above is but an abbreviated synopsis of the story. By employing the critical decisions template, Mackowski lucidly breaks down the "process" of the campaign into digestible chunks. He occasionally adds background narrative giving extra, but essential, context behind the decisions made. One final thought on Fredericksburg: what if Joe Hooker had commanded on the Left instead of the "overly cautious" Franklin? Do you suppose someone made an "critical" (sic) decision to keep "Fighting" Joe at a distance and out of the limelight?

For Civil War novices the Univ of Tennessee's Decisions Series is an excellent way to initiate a serious study of a battle or campaign before plunging into a lengthy narrative history. For others it's sometimes better to gain a familiarity with the events and players of a campaign from a narrative history before you get into the decision-making mechanics. In any case, the Decisions template provides a solid skeletal framework for hanging the facts. That said, Mackowski makes several excellent suggestions for further reading including two books by his mentor Francis (Frank) O'Reilly: [The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War on the Rappahannock](#) and ["Stonewall" Jackson at Fredericksburg: The Battle of Prospect Hill](#). Chris also regularly cited William Marvel's biography of Ambrose Burnside. Marvel is a personal favorite of mine.

Mackowski is an experienced writer with a plain-spoken easy-flowing style. And as it concerns Fredericksburg, he writes with authority. He has spent a good deal of his life studying the battle and explaining it to students, tourists, and aficionados like us. If you're new to Civil War studies and looking to acquaint yourself with the Battle of Fredericksburg, Mackowski's [Decisions at Fredericksburg](#) is a great place to start.



The caption to this illustration is "Lincoln the jokester." I think we can safely assume they're not discussing Fredericksburg.

Study Group Meeting 2024—March 21st

Dave Townsend hosted the 2nd study group meeting. There were 13 members in attendance. We have decided on a date for the study group trip. We plan on starting the tour on Monday, September 23. We are planning for 3-4 days at Gettysburg and surrounding area. Some members may be coming in earlier and or staying later, but the group tour will begin on Monday 09/23. We are planning to tour the battlefield in the same sequence as the fighting occurred. We will begin to think about hotel reservations in the next few months.

Concerning the study group meeting the subject was the advancement of both armies towards Gettysburg in June of 1863. We usually have a topic we start the meeting on, but the conversation is about anything Gettysburg related.

Larry Peterson gave a presentation on the Confederate plans in the spring of 1863 for their campaigning. This included deciding on whether to send troops to either Tennessee or to Vicksburg, Mississippi. He gave some background on earlier proposals/movements into northern territory. Larry mentioned a book: North with Lee and Jackson: The Lost Story of Gettysburg – Kegel, James, as an interesting read on the subject.

Longtime member, Brent Brown provided a prepared document “John Buford, The Evolution of the U.S. Cavalry, Dragoons, Gettysburg, etc.” Brent provided a good historical explanation on cavalry, dragoons and information on Buford’s military career, Old World relationships between the two and the formation of 1st and 2nd U.S. Cavalry in 1855. In these two units were many men who would become generals on both sides in the war.

Matt Spruill provided a map from Association of Licensed Battlefield Guides of the Gettysburg Battlefield.

I thank all three, Larry, Brent, and Matt for their contributions to our study group meeting.

I especially thank the Townsends for hosting our meeting. Next month we will be talking about the 07/01/63 and the fighting on the first day. If anyone would like to do a presentation for the study group, please let me know.



Actor Sam Elliott visiting the grave of BG John Buford. Elliott played Buford in the film “Gettysburg”. Buford was the subject of a short presentation on cavalry by Brent Brown at Study Group last month.

Facebook/Photography

ABOUT THE RMCWRT

THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN CIVIL WAR ROUNDTABLE (RMCWRT) IS A COLORADO BASED GROUP OF CIVIL WAR ENTHUSIASTS THAT MET FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 1991. OUR MEMBERSHIP REPRESENTS A VARIETY OF BACKGROUNDS INCLUDING PUBLISHED CIVIL WAR AUTHORS, SCHOLARS, BATTLEFIELD TOUR GUIDES, LIBRARIANS, LAWYERS, DOCTORS, ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL WAR TRUST, AND HOBBYISTS. NEW MEMBERS AND GUESTS ARE WELCOME. ANNUAL DUES OF \$32 CONFER FULL MEMBERSHIP PRIVILEGES INCLUDING OUR NEWSLETTER. THE RMCWRT IS A 501C3 UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION AND ALL DONATIONS ARE TAX DEDUCTIBLE TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY THE LAW.

Rocky Mountain Civil War Roundtable <http://www.flickr.com/groups/rmcwrt/>

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Study Group Coordinator— Don Hallstrom

Newsletter Editor — Guy Bowman (303-880-0897) guybo711@gmail.com

Our Monthly Meeting: the 2nd Thursday of each month @ 6 pm, social hour; 7 pm business & lecture hour.

Columbine United Church, 6375 South Platte Canyon Rd.

Littleton, CO. Attendees receive on free ticket for our book drawing. Additional tickets can be purchased @ 5 for \$1.

You can mail your dues to:

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c/o Ray Polster
5243 S Jellison St.
Littleton, CO 80123